In this paper we establish a relationship between the core cover of a compromise admissible game and the core of a particular bankruptcy game: the core cover of a compromise admissible game is, indeed, a translation of the set of coalitionally stable allocations captured by an associated bankruptcy game. Moreover, we analyze the combinatorial complexity of the core cover and, consequently, of the core of a compromise stable game.
Introduction
In the theory of cooperative TU games, the investigation of relations among different set valued solutions is crucial for a better understanding of these solutions. The core (Gillies 1953) of a TU game is the set of all efficient allocations that are coalitionally stable. In other words, all the core allocations are coalitionally stable in the sense that there is no coalition S with incentives to split off. The core cover (Tijs and Lipperts 1982) is the set of all efficient allocations satisfying that every player receives neither more than his utopia payoff, nor less than his minimal right. Both set valued solutions are convex polytopes and therefore can be described by the convex hull of their A. Estévez-Fernández Tinbergen Institute and Department of Econometrics and Operations Research, VU University Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands extreme points. Besides, when the game is convex, the set of extreme points of the core coincides with the set of marginal vectors (Shapley 1953; Ichiishi 1981) . Quant et al. (2005) showed that the extreme points of the core cover of compromise admissible games are the larginal vectors.
As the name implies, the core cover is a core catcher. The games with a nonempty core cover satisfying that all core cover allocations are coalitionally stable are called compromise stable games, that is, for this subclass of games, the core and the core cover coincide. The subclass of compromise stable games contains both convex and not convex games. Quant et al. (2005) showed that convex compromise stable games are strategically equivalent to bankruptcy games (O'Neill 1982; Aumann and Maschler 1985) . Recently, Platz et al. (2011) characterized the subsets of larginal vectors satisfying that the game is compromise stable if, and only if, one of such subsets is contained in the core.
Our aim is to investigate new relations between the core cover of compromise admissible games and the core of bankruptcy games. Our main contribution here is Theorem 4, where we show that the core cover of a compromise admissible game is a translation of the core of a particular associated bankruptcy game. Therefore, the core cover of a compromise admissible game is, up to a translation, the set of coalitionally stable allocations captured by the associated bankruptcy game.
Shapley (1971) studied in detail the core of convex games. Recently, González-Díaz and Sánchez-Rodríguez (2008) further analyzed the core of convex games by introducing face games. Given a game (N , v) with a non-empty core and a coalition T ⊂ N , a T -face game is defined in such a way that the core of this T -face game coincides with the core allocations of the game (N , v) that provide the best payoff for coalition T and the worst payoff for its complementary coalition N \ T . González-Díaz and Sánchez-Rodríguez (2008) showed that the core of convex games can be rebuilt with the cores of the face games. Any face game is related to a specific coalition T , and there are so many face games as coalitions. In this paper, we establish that all bankruptcy face games are new bankruptcy games. Combining the results of González-Díaz and Sánchez-Rodríguez (2008) and Theorem 4, we obtain that the core cover of a compromise admissible game can also be rebuilt with the core covers of some specific bankruptcy games.
Several rules for bankruptcy problems have been redefined in the context of compromise admissible games: the adjusted proportional rule (τ value) in González-Díaz et al. (2005) , the Talmud rule (nucleolus) in Quant et al. (2005) , and the run to the bank rule (the Shapley value) in Quant et al. (2006) . Here, we consider a general formula, which is already used in the papers previously mentioned, for extending bankruptcy rules to the class of compromise admissible games. It turns out that, if the bankruptcy rule is invariant under claims truncation, then, the corresponding value always belongs to the core cover. Particularly, we consider the constrained equal awards rule (CEA) and show that its associated value for compromise admissible games belongs to the core cover of a specific T -face game of an associated bankruptcy game.
Another goal of this paper is to show the complexity of the core cover with regard to the maximal number of extreme points. It is well known that for an n-player game, n! is the maximal number of extreme core allocations. With the exception of 3-player games, the maximal number of extreme core cover vertices is strictly less than n!.
